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In this article the author explains the choice of law rules that
affect riparian rights following changes in water boundaries due to
accretion or avulsion. The article examines the current use of federal
common law to determine riparian rights in various contexts. It also
considers the use of state law as the appropriate rule of decision.
Finally, the article suggests that federal protection of riparian rights
should be based on the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition
against taking without just compensation.

FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION TO DISPUTES INVOLVING
ACCRETIVE AND AVULSIVE, CHANGES
IN THE BOUNDS OF NAVIGABLE
WATERS
By John C. Cabaniss*
This article will explore the need and basis for applying
a uniform federal common law of riparian rights' to determine property ownership when a change occurs in the bounds
of a navigable watercourse. The declaration of a uniform
federal rule is one of two alternatives open to a federal
court once it has been established that federal interests reCopyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming

*Associate, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; J.D., Wayne State
University, 1981; B.S.M.E. Michigan Technological University, 1977; Member, Wisconsin State Bar.
The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Professor Robert Abrams and William Frey, Esq.
1. Riparian rights arise from ownership of land adjoining or underlying a
stream. These rights relate to use of the water and ownership of the soils
beneath the waters. J. SAX, WATER LAW PLANNING AND POLICY 1 (1968);

Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 128 Ala. 335, 30 So. 645 (1900). See generally
Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RuT. L. REV. 621, 627 (1968);
Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159 (1930).
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quire the use of federal common law.' The other available
alternative is the adoption of state law as the federal rule
of decision.
Several areas of potential federal interest will be discussed after the current state of the law in each area is set
forth. The proper choice of law for establishing the initial
boundary of a federal patent will first be addressed. This
will be followed by a review of whether federal or state law
governs the riparian rights possessed by one whose property
was the subject of a prestatehood federal patent when that
property has been affected by a poststatehood accretive4 or
avulsivel change. Then, a portion of this note will focus on
2. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) ; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,

315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942).

3. The Court stated that "[a]lthough we have determined that federal law
ultimately controls the issue in this case, it is still true that '[c]ontroversies
governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform
Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide
federal rules ....
federal rule is a matter of judicial policy. . . .'" Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe, supra note 2, at 671-72. See also C. WRTGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 60, at 278-86 (3d ed. 1976); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63 (1966) ; United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 356-57 (1966).
4. The United States Supreme Court has stated that an accretion is an addition to land bounded by water which forms so slowly that it cannot be
perceived. Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 193 (1890). The
accretion doctrine is used to maintain the riparian character of land by
granting soil accumulations to riparian owners. Just as riparian owners
stand to gain property if soil is deposited on their property, they also stand
to lose title to soil which is gradually eroded into the water. United States
v. Claridge, 416 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 961 (1970) ;
Peterson v. Morton, 465 F. Supp. 986 (D. Nev. 1979). For a discussion of
the accretion and avulsion doctrines, see Note, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 AaIZ. L. REv. 315
(1972). See also infra note 45.
5. A change in the bounds of a waterbody is deemed avulsive when there is a
drastic change which occurs rapidly and is easily perceived. It usually
results from a violent shift of water during a flood, storm or channel
breakthrough and when the doctrine applies, boundaries are held to be
where they were prior to the sudden change. See Bauman v. ChoctawChickasaw Nations, 333 F.2d 785, 789 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 965 (1965). See also Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 169-77
(1918) ; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892). In Smith v. United
States, 593 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1979), the court quoted from Bauman,
supra, as follows:
"Accretion" denotes the process by which the area of owned land is
increased by the gradual deposit of soil due to the action of a bounding
river or other body of water. Accretion occurs when the change in the
river is gradual and imperceptible. The gradualness of the process
distinguishes accretion from the more rapid, easily perceived, and sometimes violent, shifts of land incident to floods, storms or channel breakthroughs known as "avulsion." A sudden change in the channel of a
river, as occurs in the case of avulsion, does not affect title to the
lands thus transferred from one side of the river to the other.
593 F.2d at 984.
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the similar but distinct issue of what federal interests are
present in determining the type and scope of title acquired
by the public land states upon their admission to statehood
under the equal footing doctrine.' This topic is one of recent
inconsistent decisions by the United States Supreme Court.
Also, the choice of law rule for locating an interstate boundary which has been affected by an accretive or avulsive
change will be set forth. Finally, this note will consider
what law should be employed when an accretive or avulsive
change affects property held in trust by the federal government for an Indian tribe.
I. HISTORY OF LAND AND WATER RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES

When the colonies achieved independence from British
rule, each of the thirteen original states, as a sovereign,
succeeded to all interests in title previously held by the
Crown in the waters and riverbeds within their boundaries.7
In comparison, most of the western states were formed out
of land that had been held by the federal government in trust
for the establishment of future states.8 These western states
are termed the "public land states" as a consequence of the
federal government's role as sovereign prior to formation
of the states.'
Because the public land states were once governed only
by the federal government, resolution of certain disputes
which might adversely affect the scope of title conveyed by
the federal government prior to statehood must be examined
6. The constitutional basis of the equal footing doctrine was explained by the
Court in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), where
the Court concluded that: "The shores of navigable waters, and the soils
under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but
were reserved to the States respectively. Secondly, the new States have the
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original
States." Id. at 230.
7. In Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842), the Court stated
that "when the Revolution took place, the people of each State became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all
their navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common
use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution." See
also Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6, at 229; Mobile Transp. Co. v.
Mobile, 187 U.S. 479 (1903).
8. The only states not formed out of the public domain other than the original
13 states were Texas, Vermont, Maine, West Virginia and Kentucky. See
1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 40.2, at 248 n.19 (1967).
9. Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875).
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pursuant to federal law."0 In contrast, states without a
history of federal land ownership do not have this federal
involvement. This disparity in treatment accorded to various
states has resulted from the diversity of state title histories.
Additionally, the varied history of land titles among the
states has resulted in a diversity of legal rules for determining ownership of the land beneath the high-water mark
of the water in each state." In most states, ownership of
such land depends upon whether or not the water is classified as navigable." If the water is deemed non-navigable,
generally, the title to the beds can be held by a private
party.' However, if the water is classified as navigable,
then the land is held by most states in their sovereign
capacity in order to further the public need associated with
navigation and fishery.14
Within the public lands, prior to statehood, the federal
government held title to the beds beneath the navigable
waters." As states were formed out of this land, they were
admitted on an "equal footing" with the existing states."
This admission upon equal footing was held to be constitu10. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) ; Knight v.
United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891) ; Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S.
661 (1891); St Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272
(1868).
11. Some jurisdictions determine ownership of land beneath their waters according to the English rule which grants ownership of land beneath all non-tidal
waters to riparian owners. 1 R. C.ARK, supra note 8, § 40.2. However, a
majority of states use the American rule which provides that as an incident
of sovereignty the state owns all land beneath the high water mark of its
navigable waters. Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
57 (1873) ; Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) ; Goodtitle v.
Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra
note 6; Martin v. Waddell, supra note 7.
12. As states were formed out of the public domain, they acquired title to the
lands beneath their navigable waters upon their admission to statehood
pursuant to the equal footing doctrine. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-40
(1894).
13. Ottawa Shores Home Owners Ass'n v. Lechlak, 344 Mich. 366, 73 N.W.2d
840 (1955); Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252,
38 N.W.2d 712 (1949) ; State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949) ;
Heimbecher v. City and County of Denver, 90 Colo. 346, 9 P.2d 280 (1932);
Allott v. Wilmington Light & Power Co., 288 Ill. 541, 123 N.E. 731 (1919).
14. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381
(1891).
15. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12; Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs,
supra note 11; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6; Martin v. Waddell,
supra note 7.
16. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U;S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867); Smith v. Maryland, supra note 11; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, supra note 11; Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, supra note 6. For a recent discussion of the equal footing doctrine,
see North Dakota v. Andrus, 506 F. Snpp. 619, 623-25 (D.N.D. 1981).
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tionally required so that new states would be admitted with
the same sovereign rights accorded to the original thirteen
states. 7 Further, it was held that this doctrine required
the federal government to relinquish its interest in title to
the land beneath the navigable waters of the public lands
to the new states upon their admission to the union. 8 Although this doctrine mandated a conveyance to the states
of the beds beneath their navigable waters on the date
when statehood was granted, it did not completely eradicate
the federal interests present. 9 The determination of what
waters were navigable at the time statehood was granted
was held to be a federal question to be measured by the
federal test of navigability." Thus, federal courts decide
what subaqueous lands were conveyed to the states upon their
admission to the union pursuant to federal standards.
Federal title in non-navigable waters and the beds
beneath them continued within the newly formed states. 2 '
This federal ownership complemented the large quantity of
land owned by the federal government. The extent of the
federal interests created a potential water use conflict between persons who were appropriating water pursuant to
state appropriation systems and persons that would subsequently acquire title as federal patentees. 2 The appropriators feared that the federal courts might recognize riparian
rights in patentees that would diminish their right to an
established quantity of water. By adopting an appropriation
17. In Pollard'sLessee, the Court explained that pursuant to the equal footing
doctrine, the new states upon admission to the union had acquired all the
powers of sovereignty except those delegated to the United States by the
Constitution. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6, at 229.
18. Smith v. Maryland, supra note 11; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, supra note 11;
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6.
19. See infra note 31 and accompanying text on reserved water rights; see also
infra note 82 and accompanying text.
20. The Court in United States v. Oregon held that the issue of what waters
were navigable at the time of a state's admission to the union presented a
federal question. 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
21. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10; United States v.
Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391 (1903); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892); Knight v. United Land Ass'n, supra note 10; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
22. In the eastern states riparian owners are entitled to use a reasonable
amount of the available water. Thus, as more persons acquire title to property on a water body, all must share the available supply equally. As the
western states were formed, they adopted a system of prior appropriation
to encourage development. This approach guaranteed prior appropriators
continued use of an undiminished quantity of water.
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system of water use, the western states acted to encourage
development in an arid region where assurance of a constant
water supply was essential to induce settlement." To quell
state concerns over federal interference with state systems
of water allocation, Congress passed the Acts of 18664 and
187025 which gave vested state water use rights priority
over the claims of federal patentees.28 These Acts, however,
left open the possibility that a federal patentee's riparian
rights to the water might be accorded higher priority than
the rights of a subsequent state appropriator. Congress acted
to remedy this oversight by passing the Desert Land Act of
1877.27 This Act has been held to have severed the unappropriated waters from the federal lands riparian to them. 8
This severance was based on the federal proprietary right
to the water and allowed the states to establish their own
independent systems of water use allocation.29 However, the
Act failed to specify what rights, if any, were retained by
federal riparian land patentees. The states have contended
that the Desert Land Act was nothing short of a complete
surrender of federal power over water use rights to the
states." This assertion of absolute state power was rejected
by the Court when it held the Act inapplicable to lands
held in trust by the federal government for Indian tribes.
This holding was based on the Court's finding that implied
in reservation treaties were reserved rights to enough water
to permit its use on all irrigable reservation lands. 1
Congressional legislation concerning waterways and
land riparian thereto has usually been based on the Commerce and/or Property clauses. 2 The navigational power,
23.
24.
25.
26.

1 R. CLARK, supra note 8, §§ 18.1-.2.
43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
Id.
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142

(1935).

27. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976). Kansas, Nebraska and Oklahoma are not subject
to the Desert Land Act.
28. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., aupra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900); Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
31. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908); see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
32. Arizona v. California, supra note 31, at 597; Winters v. United States,
supra note 31.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/1

6

Cabaniss: Federal Common Law and Its Application to Disputes Involving Accr

1982

FEDERAL COMMON LAW

335

which flows from the Commerce clause,8 has been construed
to give the federal government a navigational servitude that
extends to the ordinary high-water mark. 4 This servitude
has been held to be superior to private property interests
found to interfere with the federal government's interest in
navigation. 5 In contrast to the unquestioned superiority of
the federal navigational power when exercised in conflict
with a state or individual interest, it is unclear how the
property clause applies to the resolution of federal-state
disputes. 6 In decisions considering reserved water rights
for Indian reservation land, the power of the federal government to grant implied reservations has been held to flow
from the Property and Commerce clauses. 7 The Court in
dicta in Paul v. United States" seemed to accept the view
that federal property, acquired without state consent, would
be held as if held by any other private owner subject to
rights defined by state law." This view of the Property
clause's scope was repudiated by the Court in Kleppe v. New

Mexico.4" There, it was held that, regardless of state consent,
the Property clause empowered Congress to exercise "the
powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the
public domain."4 Hence, Congressional authority over the

public lands is not controlled by state law.4" However, state
law can limit the use of federal property to the extent it
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
34. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); United States v. Chicago
Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941)
35. When the United States reserves the flow either of a navigable or nonnavigable stream pursuant to its navigational power, it is exercising an
established power derived from the Commerce clause that is superior to
whatever state interests may exist. United States v. Grand River Dam
Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
36. The Property clause states: "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or
of any particular State." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
37. Winters v. United States, supra note 31; United States v. Rio Grande Dam
& Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
38. 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
39. Id. at 264.
40. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
41. Id. at 540.
42. See United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). The Court, in San
Francisco, stated that pursuant to the Property clause: "The power over
the public land thus intrusted to Congress is without limitations. 'And it is
not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for
Congress to determine'." Id. at 29-30 (quoting Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 537 (1911)).
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does not affect the government's title or interfere with its
right of disposal.4"
The problems considered by this article arise when the
bounds of a water body change. Under both federal and state
law, when such a change is deemed to be the result of accretion, riparian owners gain title to any resulting additions
to their property.44 Conversely, when erosion occurs the
riparian owner loses title to the land that is consumed by
the water."5 The application of the accretion doctrine is
premised on the rationale that an upland owner's access
to the water should be maintained whenever possible without creating an undue hardship on abutting property owners.
It has been stated that the effect of the accretion doctrine
is to give riparian owners a fee that is determinable upon
the occupancy of their land by the river." Likewise, title
to the riverbed is subject to defeasance upon a reliction by
the river." In comparison, the avulsion doctrine" is used to
maintain title boundaries where they were prior to a sudden
and drastic change in a watercourse even if this results in
a loss of access to the water for some property owners. 9
This doctrine is employed when necessary to minimize the
hardship that would result to abutting landowners if the
accretion doctrine was followed." The courts have thus
43. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 142 (1937) ; Surplus Trading
Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650 (1930).
44. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967); Arkansas v. Tennessee,
246 U.S. 158, 169-77 (1918); Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S.
178, 189 (1890); Smith v. Whitney, 105 Mont. 523, 74 P.2d 450 (1937).
See also Comment, Land Accretion and Avulsion: The Battle of Blackbird
Bend, 56 NEB. L. REV. 814 (1977).
45. See New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836). In New
Orleans,the Court discussed the doctrine of accretion and stated that every
riparian is "subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory; and as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot be
held accountable for his gain." Id. at 717. See Note, Courts-Navigable
Waters-State Law, Not Federal, Determines Riparian Rights to Accretions, 54 N.D.L. REV. 505, 506-07 (1978).
46. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973), rev'd, Oregon ex
rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
47. Reliction is the term used to describe the process whereby water recedes
from land that it formerly covered. Hammond v. Shepard, 186 Ill. 235, 57
N.E. 867 (1900).
48. See supra note 5.
49. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 624 (1912); St. Louis v. Rutz,
138 U.S. 226, 245 (1891).
50. Nebraska v. Iowa, supra note 5. In this case the Court discussed the accretion and avulsion doctrines and stated with respect to the avulsion doctrine:
But, on the other hand, if, deserting its original bed, the river
forces for itself a new channel in another direction, then the nation,
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recognized that if followed without exception, the accretion
doctrine would on occasion result in an inequitable redistribution of property among property owners following a
drastic change in the bounds of a waterway.
II. FACTORS AFFECTING THE USE AND CONTENT
OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Swift v. Tyson,5 the Rules of Decision

Under
Act was
held to allow the federal courts to develop a general body of
common law applicable to all disputes that were not strictly
matters of "local law".2 This remained the law of the land
until 1938 when the Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,5 a suit based on diversity jurisdiction, overruled
Swift by holding that state law applied, including state
decisional law, unless supplanted by the Constitution or an
act of Congress. Following Erie, the test of what law, federal or state, is used in diversity actions has evolved into a
consideration of the policies that underlie Erie. 4 These
policies were held to be "discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.""
Although at first glance Erie might appear to eliminate any
use of federal common law, the Court, on the same day Erie

51.
52.

53.
54.

55.

through whose territory the river thus breaks its way, suffers injury
by loss of territory greater than the benefit of retaining the natural
river boundary, and that boundary remains in the middle of the deserted river bed. For, in truth, just as a stone pillar constitutes a
boundary, not because it is stone, but because of the place in which it
stands, so a river is made the limit of nations, not because it is running
water bearing a certain geographical name, but because it is water
flowing in a given channel, and within given banks....
Id. at 362.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
The Rules of Decision Act stated that:
[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States in cases where they apply.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1976) and the term "civil actions" replaces "trials at common law").
In Swift v. Tyson, supra note 51, the Court interpreted the phrase "laws
of the several states" as referring to only state statutes and "local" common
law rules. The distinction that emerged under Swift between local and general law was not expressly articulated by the Court, but it was clear from
the Swift decision that whether a state had an applicable law was of no
relevance in determining what law applied.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The Erie doctrine is not applicable to issues governed by federal law even
when the suit is based on diversity. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co.,
317 U.S. 173 (1942). See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv.
L. REv. 1013 (1953).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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was issued, held that federal common law governed resolution of a dispute between two states involving apportionment of waters in an interstate stream." Thus, federal
common law does exist.
Before a federal court can adjudicate a dispute, it must
generally be demonstrated that either federal question or
diversity jurisdiction exists." Actions based on claims arising under federal law-Constitution, laws of the United
States, or treaties-are within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts." However, there are several
situations where the Court has recognized the need for
granting federal question jurisdiction despite the fact that
the issue presented did not arise directly from the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The Court in
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States" held that when Congress has not addressed an issue which is "substantially
related to an established program of governmental operation," federal courts must fill the existing gaps in federal
law according to federal standards.6 Also, in United States
v. Standard Oil Co.,"' the Court held that the federal nature
of the relationship between a soldier and the government
required federal common law to govern the legal consequences of that relationship." In both of these situations
the Court developed federal common law. 4 The Court has
56. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938). The use of federal law in interstate disputes reflects a recognition
of the need for resolution of such disputes before a neutral third party, and
the propriety of using federal decisional law in this type of situation has
long been recognized. As stated in the Federalist papers, "[n]o man ought
certainly to be a judge in his own cause .... This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts as the proper tribunals
for the determination of controversies between different states ... " THE
FEDERALIST No. 80, at 538 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
57. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1332 (1976).
58. Federal courts were provided jurisdiction over "[c]ases in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority" by the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
59. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
60. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
(quoting Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA.
L. Rav. 797, 800 (1957)).
61. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 59, at 367.
62. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
63. Id.
64. Recently the Court rejected the assertion that there was a federal common
law right of contribution among antitrust conspirators. Texas Indus., Inc. v.
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also held that federal common law can independently supply
the necessary federal question jurisdiction since it is included within the constitutional meaning of "laws of the
65
United States.1
Once the source of law is found to be federal, then the
federal courts must apply a federal rule of decision. If the
issue presented in a particular case is not resolved expressly
by reference to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States, then federal common law controls. In applying federal common law, a court must choose whether to
adopt state law or develop a uniform federal rule as the
rule of decision.6" A test for determining what law to apply
has not been consistently used by the Court. However, certain factors have reappeared in the cases. The Court has
sometimes used a balancing test which weighs the federal
and state interests." On other occasions the Court has only
focused on a more limited set of factors which it considers
controlling while ignoring any comprehensive review of the
factors it has previously deemed important.68 This inconsistent approach makes it difficult to predict with any con-

65.

66.

67.
68.

Radcliff Materials, Inc.. .......
U.S ........
, 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981). In Texas
Industries, the Court stated that:
[F]ederal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases. In these
instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy to be
resolved under state law, either because the authority and duties of the
United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because the interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate
for state law to control.
Id. at 2067.
See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The Court held that
federal question jurisdiction existed because Milwaukee had violated the
federal common law of nuisance and, further, it found that the federal common law had not been pre-empted by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA). Id. In a recent decision, the Court found that the 1972
amendments to the FWPCA had significantly altered the water pollution
laws and that Congress, by those amendments, had thoroughly addressed
water pollution concerns. Thus, the Court held that Congress, by its actions
subsequent to its prior decision, had pre-empted the use of federal common
law in this area of the law. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, ......
U.S.
101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra note 2; United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 62; D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., supra note 2; Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308
U.S. 343, 350 (1939).
See Mishkin, supra note 60, at 812; Comment, Adopting State Laws as the
FederalRule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. CM. L. REV.823 (1976).
See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note 2.
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fidence what the Court will find relevant in a particular
situation.
In Clearfield Trust, 9 the Supreme Court opted for the
use of a uniform federal rule by dismissing adoption because
it would subject the rights and duties of the United States
"to the vagaries of the laws of the several states."7 The
Court found the federal interest in having identical law
apply to the numerous transactions in federal commercial
paper to outweigh the state interest in having state law
govern completely the commercial transaction at issue. 7
Despite Clearfield Trust's emphasis on uniformity for cases
dealing with federal commercial paper, in Bank of America
7" the Court held that issues regarding rights in
v. Parnell,
federal commercial paper that do not touch on the rights
and duties of the federal government were matters to be
resolved by state law even though a companion issue was
present that had to be governed by federal law." Thus,
Parnell stands for the proposition that even though the federal government may have an interest in particular property, unless its interests are affected by the decision, state
law should apply.
Uniformity, as recognized by the Court in Clearfield
Trust, is a major factor which supports the use of a uniform
federal rule. In some cases the Court has weighed against
the need for uniformity the state interest in having its own
law apply because the issue presented was one of traditionally local concern. 4 Also, the Court has sometimes considered whether a conflict exists between the application of
a particular state law and federal interests." In United
States v. Little Lake Misere, the Court did not adopt the
69. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 59. In this case, a check
drawn by the United States was stolen and cashed on a forged endorsement.
The United States sued the bank which had presented the check for a breach
of its guaranty on the endorsement. If Pennsylvania law applied, the United
States would have been estopped from asserting its claim as a consequence
of its delay in notifying the bank of the forgery. However, the Court held
that federal law controlled.
70. Id. at 367.
71. See 1A J. MooRE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE pt. 2, 1 0.324 (2d ed. 1981).
72. 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
73. Id. at 33-34.
74. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 62; Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
75. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra note 60.
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available state law because it was found to be hostile to the
purposes of the federal program at issue.7" However, the
Court left open the possibility that a nonconflicting state
statute dealing with the same issue might be adopted if a
similar dispute arose in another state.7" This approach suggests that the Court desires a case by case appraisal of the
interests present. Contrary to the Erie diversity situation
where there is a lack of court competence to decide substantive issues, in this situation a court remains free to control
the extent and effect of adoption so that federal interests
will be protected.78
It has been suggested that a federal court, in deciding
whether to adopt state law, should additionally consider the
effect of its decision on the distribution of power between
the federal and state courts.7" Also of importance is the
ability of each court system to handle the issue presented.
For example, the call for "uniformity" usually is the chief
argument in support of establishing a uniform federal rule;
yet, the only way a truly uniform rule can be promulgated
is by Supreme Court action. This fact precludes the use of
a uniform rule in many areas because the Court's workload
is so heavy that it does not have the time to develop detailed
substantive rules.8" These factors should always be considered by the courts as part of a balancing approach to help
determine, as a matter of judicial policy, what law is most
appropriate for use in the case at bar.8
III. CURRENT USE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW

A. Scope of a Federal Grant
The city of Los Angeles brought an action to quiet title
in Borax Consolidate,Ltd. v. Los Angeles."2 There, the Court
76. Id.
77. Cf. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956); Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver County, supra note 74, at 210.
78. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., supra note 60; Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note 2.
79. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 507-08 (1954).
80. Mishkin, supra note 60, at 813.
81. Id. at 810-34; see United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 62, at 310.
82. Supra note 10. Los Angeles asserted that it held title pursuant to a grant
by the California legislature. Borax, on the other hand, claimed superior
title by virtue of a preemption patent issued by the federal government.
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addressed a dispute involving the issue of whether land that
bad been conveyed under a federal patent was upland or
tideland at the time of the federal grant. If tideland, it was
erroneously included in the federal patent since upon California's admission to the union it acquired all right, title
and interest in the tidelands. Conversely, if found to have
been upland, it was properly included in the federal patent.
The Court determined that the primary question posed by
this case was the extent of the federal patent. Since the
question presented involved "the validity and effect of an
act done by the United States," it was held to implicate a
federal interest."5 Thus, the Court established where the
boundary between the upland and tideland was according
to federal principles."4 Although the Court in Borax held
that federal law governed the scope of title acquired by a
federal patentee, in subsequent cases the Court has held that
state law controls with respect to the property rights afforded to private owners.8 5
B. Rights of a Federal Patentee Following an Accretive or
Avulsive Change
The Borax holding was expanded by the Court in
Hughes v. Washington"s to aid the Court in deciding whether
federal or state law applied to determine the ownership of
land gradually deposited by the ocean on upland property.
83. Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United
States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); Brewer-Elliot Oil Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922) ; Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669-70
(1891)).
84. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 22-27.
85. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., supra note 3; United States v.
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206 (1943). In Wallis the Court had
to determine whether state or federal law controlled the validity of oil and
gas leases which transferred the rights to exploit oil and gas deposits on
the public domain. In its opinion, the Court stated that:
In deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned,
normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between
some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises
must first be specifically shown. . . . Whether latent federal power
should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for
Congress. Even where there is related federal legislation in an area,
as is true in this instance, it must be remembered that "Congress acts
against the background of the total corpus juria of the states. .. ."
384 U.S. at 68 (quoting H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953)). Thus, state law was held to control
the issues in dispute since it was determined that there was no significant
conflict between the state and federal interests present.
86. Supra note 44.
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In Hughes, the upland property had been conveyed by the
federal government to the petitioner's predecessor in title
prior to Washington's grant of statehood. 7 If the land in
question had been accreted prior to statehood, under a uniform federal rule the riparian owner would have been entitled to it.8" Washington claimed that Article 17, § 1 of its
Constitution provided that it would gain title to any coastal
accretions occurring after 1889."9 This was the State's position despite the fact that the Washington Supreme Court
had previously rejected that interpretation in Ghione v.
State."
In Hughes, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed
its prior holding and found that the State's Constitution of
1889 had eliminated the application of the riparian doctrine
of accretion to property riparian to the Pacific Ocean. Thus,
the court held that the State held title to all land formed by
coastal accretions. 9 ' The case then went to the United States
Supreme Court where the applicability of federal law was
at issue. The state argued there was no federal interest
present and that Borax was inapplicable because it did not
deal with riparian rights. Notwithstanding this argument,
the Court found that there was no "significant difference"
between this case and Borax. Consequently, it held that the
question of what rights were included in the initial federal
grant was sufficient to justify the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. Moreover, the use of a uniform rule was
found to be necessary to protect the scope of the federal patentee's title.9" It was noted that to hold otherwise would leave
riparian owners in danger of losing the most valuable feature
of their land-access to the water."
87. Id.
88. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874) ; Jones v.
Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150 (1855).
89. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 provides:
The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores
of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of
ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to
and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all
navigable rivers and lakes.
90. 26 Wash. 2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946).
91. Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 816, 410 P.2d 20, 29 (1966).
92. Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44, at 292.
93. Id.
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The Court's majority opinion in Hughes relied on Borax
in holding that the issue presented required in effect a determination of a federal patent's original scope. In reaching
its decision the Court did not discuss or attempt to distinguish Borax and Hughes from its earlier decision in
Joy v. City of St. Louis. 4 In Joy, a riparian owner, whose
title descended from a prestatehood federal grant, claimed
that the federal origin of his title implicated a sufficient
federal interest to support federal question jurisdiction in
a dispute involving ownership of accretions deposited adjacent to his land.5 The Court, however, held that the federal
origin of the grant did not by itself present a federal question."6 The Court went on to note that the dispute did not
involve the land actually conveyed or an act of Congress.
Consequently, the lower court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. Joy, thus, stands for the well settled
rule that federal law should not be applied merely because
the United States happens to be a party in the chain of
title."
C. The Type and Scope of Title Acquired by the Public Land
States Upon Their Admission to the Union Under the
Equal Footing Doctrine
The Court extended the use of federal common law in
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona.5 This case involved a dispute
over land that was included in a prestatehood federal
patent to a railroad company. The land was riparian to
the Colorado River and upon admission to the union, Arizona
succeeded to the federal government's title in the bed of the
river." Over the years, the river gradually moved eastward
engulfing the subject land. As this process occurred the
State mechanically acquired title to the land as part of the
94. 201 U.S. 332 (1906).
95. Id. See also Note, RiparianRights: The Law Returns to its Former Course,
23 Loy. L. REv. 563, 568-69 (1977).
96. Joy v. City of St. Louis, supra note 94.
97. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., supra
note 46 and infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text; Shoshone Mining
Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900); United States v. Denby, 522 F.2d
1358 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Schwarz, 460 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. 1,078.27 Acres of Land, 446 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.
1971).
98. Supra note 46.
99. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 6.
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riverbed."0 When the cattle company acquired its title in
1955, most of the property conveyed by the original grant
was under water and, therefore, held by the State. In 1959,
a project by the Federal Bureau of Reclamation deepened
and rechanneled the river, thereby resulting in the re-emergence of a substantial portion of the original parcel.' The
State claimed this change was avulsive, and argued that
title to the land which formed the bed of the river prior to
reclamation remained in the state by virtue of the equal
footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act.0 2 The cattle
company alleged the change to be accretive. Alternatively,
the company asserted that even if the change was deemed
avulsive, it had reacquired title under the doctrine of reemergence.1"' The Arizona Supreme Court, however, rejected
the company's position and held the change to be avulsive
with title vested in the State.0 4
In Bonelli, the United States Supreme Court first had
to decide whether ownership of the subject land was to be
governed by state or federal law. The Court stated its continued adherence to the principle that state law should determine rights in the beds of navigable waters whose title was
indefeasibly vested by federal law in the states. It was
noted by the Court, however, that the issue was not
what rights the state had accorded to private owners, but
what type of title the state had acquired under the equal
footing doctrine and Submerged Lands Act.0 5 The Court
found that construction of this doctrine and the Act involved a "right asserted under federal law"; therefore, it
presented a federal question.00 After an examination of
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.
105.
106.

Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 318; see Oklahoma v. Texas,
268 U.S. 252 (1925).
When the Bonelli Cattle Co. acquired the land in 1955, 530 of the original
590 acres were submerged beneath the river. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,
supra note 46, at 316.
The State claimed to own all property up to the pre-Hoover -dam ordinary
high-water mark. After the dam began to operate, less of the subject land
was covered by the river's high water mark. Id. at 317.
Id. at 316. In Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 5, at 175, the Court stated
that the doctrine of reemergence "amounts to no more than saying that
where the reliction did but restore that which before had been private
property and had been lost through the violence of the sea, the private
right should be restored if the land is capable of identification."
State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971).
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 319-20.
Id. at 321.
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the policies behind the avulsion and accretion doctrines, the
Court held that the state had acquired a fee determinable
to the land that had gradually eroded into the river."'
When this land re-emerged, the state's interest in the former
riverbed was held to be defeased and title reverted to the
riparian owner. The Court reasoned that when the water
receded from the subject property there was no longer a
public purpose being served by state retention of title to
the re-emerged tract."' 8 Further, it was stated that, if allowed, continued state ownership of this property would
have allowed the deprived private owner to possibly raise
a constitutional objection that the state's assertion of title
had resulted in a taking without just compensation." 9 This
issue was not addressed by the Court because, after
balancing the federal and state interests, it held that title
to the re-emerged land should be governed by the federal
principle of accretion to protect the riparian owner's right
of access to the water and to prevent the state's receipt of
a land windfall."'
Growth of the federal common law of riparian rights
was curtailed and severely restricted when the Court overruled Bonelli in Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co."'
The dispute in Corvallis centered on the issue of whether the
State or the Corvallis Sand and Gravel Company owned
land which formed a peninsula known as the Fischer Cut."'
The Willamette River flowed around this peninsula, but
by 1890 a channel had formed across its neck. During
periods when the river's flow was intermediate to high, the
new channel would carry part of the resulting flow. In 1909,
a major flood occurred which resulted in the entire Fischer
Cut being submerged. Subsequent to this change the company used the area in its digging operations for 40-50 years.
Oregon brought suit to eject Corvallis Sand from the property claiming that it was owner in fee simple of the disputed
107. Id. at 326.
108. Id. at 328.
109. Id. at 331 (citing Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44, at 298) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
110. Id. at 325-30; Note, supra note 45, at 509-10.
Supra
note 46.
111.
112. Id. The property in dispute had been included in a pre-statehood federal
grant.
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land. This claim was based on the assertion that as new
beds were formed under navigable waters, fee simple title
to them automatically vested in the state as an incident of
sovereignty under the equal footing doctrine.'13 The Oregon
courts used federal common law as set forth in Bonelli to
award the disputed land to Corvallis Sand under either the
avulsion theory or pursuant to an exception to the accretion
rule.114
The Supreme Court in Corvallis held that the state
court had erred in treating the equal footing doctrine as the
source of a federal interest which required application of a
uniform federal rule to questions concerning title acquired
by the states from the federal government to the riverbeds
beneath navigable waters.'
Not only was this basis for
federal question jurisdiction rejected, but the Court also
stated that the mere fact a parcel of land had originally
been conveyed by a federal grant does not give rise to a
controversy arising under the laws of the United States." '
Borax was explained by the Court as only being applicable
to disputes involving the location of an original boundary." '
Hughes was not considered since it was not cited below by
the Oregon courts. This abrupt change in the Court's analysis resulted in the quick burial of Bonelli as the basis for
applying federal common law. Consequently, it appears that
disputes concerning land ownership will now be resolved
solely as a matter of state law unless a federal interest other
than federal origin of title or conveyance under the equal
footing doctrine can be established." '
D. Disputes Over Interstate Boundaries
Disputes involving the location of interstate boundaries
affected by accretive or avulsive changes have consistently
113. Id. at 372-73.
114. State ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 272 Or. 545,
536 P.2d 517, reh'g denied, 272 Or. 545, 538 P.2d 70 (1975); see Commissioners v. United States, 270 F. 110 (8th Cir. 1920).
115. Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., supra note
46, at 370-71.
116. Id. at 372. The Court stated that, "Pollard's Lessee . .. holds that the State
receives absolute title to the beds of navigable waterways within its boundaries upon admission to the Union, and contains not the slightest suggestion
that such title is 'defeasible' in the technical sense of that term." Id.
117. Id. at 376.
118. Id. at 381-82.
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been recognized by the courts and commentators as requiring the use of a uniform federal rule.11 The Supreme Court
has held that even though the issue is not governed explicitly
by the Constitution or federal statute, federal common law
principles of accretion and avulsion must necessarily be
developed and used to avoid the problems inherent in adopting state law to resolve interstate conflicts.12 This approach
was used in Arkansas v. Tennessee, 2 ' where a river, which
indicated the interstate boundary, suddenly changed course.
The Court declared that state law would determine the
rights of riparian owners within their own state, but that
a state could not render a decision that might affect an
interstate boundary.122 Since classification of a change as
accretive or avulsive can determine whether a state gains
or loses property along an interstate boundary, the Court
used a uniform federal rule to resolve the issue of what
type of change occurred." 3
E. Disputes Over Land Held in Trust by the Federal Government
The Courts have recognized a federal interest in protecting lands held in trust by the United States for American Indian tribes. Most of the Indian tribes occupy reservations that were set aside for them by federal treaty or
executive order.'24 Within reservation boundaries, property
and sovereign rights exist that cannot be derogated by state
or federal law.' 25 Furthermore, the existence of reservations
and commerce with them is controlled by the federal government.2 6 In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,"'
the Court held that the issue of whether the Oneidas had a
119. Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 5; Nebraska v. Iowa, supra note 5.
120. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 65; Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., supra note 56.
121. Supra note 5.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 119-20.
124. United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876).
125. The courts have held that vested treaty rights cannot be impaired by legislation or state court decisions. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.2d
634 (D. Neb. 1931), aff'd, 59 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1932).
126. The federal government has the power to manage and control tribal affairs
on reservations but must do so within Constitutional bounds. United States
v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938).
127. 414 U.S. 661 (1973).
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valid claim to possession of disputed property pursuant to
a treaty with the federal government was a matter governed
by federal law.
The Oneida holding was recently reaffirmed by the
Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe."2 I In Wilson a
dispute arose over ownership of land that originally was
included in the Omaha Indian tribe's reservation which was
located in 1867 on the west bank of the Missouri River in
Nebraska. Following the establishment of the reservation,
the river changed course several times with the result that
a portion of the original reservation ended up on the east
side of the river in Iowa. This land was subsequently settled
by non-Indians. The federal government and the Omahas
brought suit to quiet title in the disputed lands claiming
that the changes in the Missouri river's course had been
avulsive and, therefore, the boundaries of the reservation
should remain unaffected. The non-Indian residents argued
that the changes in the river's course resulted from a gradual
process of erosion and accretion, thereby passing title to the
east bank riparian owners.' 9 The Court held that the Indians' claim to the property was to be resolved by federal law
citing Oneida to support its holding that questions regarding
Indian occupancy of reservations are "exclusively [within]
the province of federal law."' 3 While adopting the Oneida
holding that the adjudication of rights involving reservation
lands implicates a federal interest requiring use of a federal
common law, the Wilson Court held that state law should be
adopted as the federal rule of decision."'
The Court reached its decision after considering the
132
factors it set forth in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.
128. Supra note 2.
129. Id. at 660.
130. Id. at 670-71 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, supra note
127).
131. An interstate compact was entered into by Nebraska and Iowa in 1943. Id.
at 672. It was held that the compact governed what law would control the
resolution of interstate boundary disputes. Nebraska v. Iowa, supra note 5.
Consequently, the Court could not use a uniform federal rule in Wilson
based upon the fact that the dispute at issue involved an interstate
boundary.
132. In Kimbell the Court had to decide what law governed the relative priority
between liens arising under a federal loan program and private liens. After
deciding that federal law governed resolution of the dispute the Court
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There it had grappled with a choice between adopting state
law or applying a uniform federal rule to govern the relative
priority between a private lien and a federally created lien.
In Wilson the Court concluded that there was no need to
develop a uniform federal rule since an interstate boundary
was not in dispute. Further, the Court expressed concern
that a uniform federal rule would result in disparaging
treatment of the private property owners located next to the

Indian reservation. The fear was that they might have their
boundary disputes resolved differently than persons who
were not similarly located adjacent to an Indian reservation."8 3 The Court also asserted that state law would be
applied in an equitable fashion and that a tribe might gain
as well as lose land. Finally, the Court stated that it would
not accept "generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes
for concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely

affect [federal interests]."1 "'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Extent of a Federal Grant
In Borax the Court held that the initial boundaries of
federal grants are to be determined according to federal
rules of construction. This approach was chosen as necessary

to protect private interests acquired pursuant to federal
dispositions of property. If state law were allowed to deterquestioned whether it should adopt state law as the federal rule of decision.
In analyzing this issue the Court stated that:
Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a
matter of judicial ploicy "dependent upon a variety of considerations
always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests
and to the effects upon them of applying state law."
[WJhen there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law,
state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision. Aparf
from considerations of uniformity, we must also determine whether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solicitous of those
federal interests. Finally, our choice of law inquiry must consider the
extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial
relationships predicated on state law.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra note 2, at 728-29. The Court in
Kimbell found no need for a uniform rule, and it further determined that
adopting state law would not adversely affect federal interests. Therefore,
state law was adopted.
133. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note 2, at 674.
134. Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra note 2, at
730).
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mine the scope of federal grants, it could operate to impair
the validity of the congressional act which authorized the
conveyance. This would run afoul of the supremacy clause'3
and Congress' power to dispose of federal property pursuant
to the property clause.13 Since disputes involving the extent
of a federal grant present questions regarding rights accorded by federal law, federal question jurisdiction is present
to govern such disputes."3 ' It should be noted that Borax was
decided prior to Erie and it, therefore, contained no discussion of adopting state law as the federal rule of decision.
B. Rights of a FederalPatentee After an Accretive or Avulsive Change
The Court has left unresolved the direct conflict between
Hughes and the Corvallis and Joy line of cases. Corvallis and
Joy considered the issue of whether a federal patent provided a basis for federal question jurisdiction, thereby enabling the courts to use federal common law to determine
whether a poststatehood change was accretive or avulsive. 1'1
In Corvallis, the Court refused to reconsider Hughes since
it was not relied on below. The Court did hint in a footnote
that the fact Hughes involved a parcel of land on the boundary of an international sea might have been sufficient to
justify the use of federal common law.13 If the federal courts
do indeed have the power to determine the future right to
accretions on such oceanfront property based upon the federal interests involved in the location of an international
boundary, then the equal footing doctrine would be as offended as it is in similar non-oceanfront disputes since
federal law has not been applied to govern a change that
affected oceanfront property in one of the original 13
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, which states as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10.
138. Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., supra
note 46, at 377 n.6.
139. Id.
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states. 4 ' Thus, this distinction lacks merit. Either the prestatehood federal grant is a basis for federal question
jurisdiction or it is not, and the weight of authority is that
it is not. Therefore, the continued validity of the majority
opinion in Hughes on this point is doubtful and it appears
to be an isolated decision with little validity after Corvallis.
Joy held that state law should control to determine
whether an accretive or avulsive change had occurred when
such a change affected land that had been the subject of a
prestatehood federal grant.' In its holding the Court noted
that state law could impair the federal patentee's use and
enjoyment of his property, but the Court failed to adequately
explore the effect of this limitation on state court authority
to deny a riparian owner water access. Thus, the Court
ignored the possibility that a right granted by federal law
could be eroded by state law. This result was supported by
the assertion that the Constitution requires, via the equal
footing doctrine, that the states established subsequent to
our nation's founding acquire the same sovereign rights as
the original 13 states. Although the equal footing doctrine
does require equality of sovereign rights, it is inevitable, as
a consequence of the federal government's initial ownership
of large quantities of western land, that the federal impact
there will be greater than in the east. The federal government conveyed property by grants prior to statehood in the
territories. By virtue of this federal origin of title, the application of federal law is required to determine the extent of
these original conveyances. 4 The result is a displacement
of state rules of construction. In the founding 13 states,
this application of federal principles is not required. However, it is not asserted that this federal involvement infringes
on state sovereignty, rather, it is perceived as a reflection
of the need to protect the scope of the federal title conveyed.
140. In a post-Hughes decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that its
state law of accretions determined whether lands formed on upland adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean were owned by the State or the upland owner.
Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella, 51 N.J. 352, 240 A.2d 665
(1968).
141. Unlike the situation in Hughes, in Joy the state court's decree did not
operate retroactively to radically change prior law.
142. See supra notes 82-84.
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Although at first glance the foregoing analysis may
seem to be inapposite to the equal footing doctrine, it might
only be the result of the varied histories and not an interference with state sovereignty. The Court has noted that
the equal footing doctrine was not intended to destroy all
differences but was only intended to insure parity with
regard to political standing and sovereignty. 4 ' The state's
sovereign rights were not deemed to have been undermined
by granting the riparian owner the right to accretions under
federal law by the Hughes Court, but Hughes now appears
to be little more than an aberration.
The federal jurisdiction in Hughes rested solely on the
fact that the petitioner could trace her title to a prestatehood
federal grant. This is precisely the type of case where as a
general rule state law has governed.14 ' The Hughes decision
was reached as a result of a misplaced expansion of Borax.
The Court in Borax explicitly stated that the only issue present was whether the land in controversy was upland or
tideland when California was admitted to the union.' If
found to be tideland then the Court recognized that the
State's title would be complete and, therefore, nondefeasable. Consequently, where Borax dealt exclusively with the
scope of title initially conveyed by federal grant, the Hughes
Court attempted to use it to justify a continuing federal
interpretation of poststatehood property changes. This approach ignored and placed little weight on the history of
state control over real property issues which had long been
recognized and protected by application of the equal footing
doctrine. Further, as an indication of the Court's brief and
faulty analysis in Hughes, the Court there stated that it
could choose to select state law as the federal rule but declined to do so by asserting that Borax had held that no
such choice should be made in this area of the law.4 7 What
the Court failed to recognize was that Borax was decided
143. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 320; Shively v. Bowlby,
supra note 12, at 43; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 333 (1876).
144. Joy v. City of St. Louis, supra note 94; Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
498 (1839).
145. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 16.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Hughes v. Washington, supra note 44, at 293.
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prior to Erie when there was no adoption of state law, and,
thus, that possibility had not been considered as an option.
Consequently, Borax should not have been cited as controlling on that issue.
The Court's real concern in Hughes might have been
that addressed by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion.
In it, he accepted the state's power to change and fully determine the laws governing riparian rights. He saw this power
as an incident of the state's constitutionally delegated control over real property matters. Justice Stewart did not
think this delegation of authority to the states should be
manipulated to prevent state abuses. Instead, he found that
the needed protection for individual property owners was
provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendments' proscription against state confiscation of property rights without
just compensation. 4" This proposed use of constitutional
safeguards to protect valuable riparian rights would
have allowed the Court to accord proper deference to
state real property law while preventing the type of state
abuse which prompted the Court to manipulate the equal
footing doctrine. So far the Court has not acted to so extend
fifth and fourteenth amendment protections.
A Hawaii federal district court in Robinson v. Ariyoheld that a radical departure by the Supreme Court
of Hawaii in its interpretation of well established water
law resulted in the taking of private property without just
shi149

148. Justice Stewart stated that:
Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of real
property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual States to
develop and administer. And surely Washington or any other State is
free to make changes, either legislative or judicial, in its general rules
of real property law, including the rules governing the property rights
of riparian owners. Nor are riparian owners who derive their title from
the United States somehow immune from the changing impact of these
For if they were, then the property law of a
general state rules ....
State like Washington, carved entirely out of federal territory, would
be forever frozen into the mold it occupied on the date of the State's
admission to the Union. It follows that Mrs. Hughes cannot claim immunity from changes in the property law of Washington simply because
her title derives from a federal grant. Like any other property owner,
however, Mrs. Hughes may insist, quite apart from the federal origin
of her title, that the State not take her land without just compensation.
Id. at 295.
149. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977).
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compensation. 15 0 This constitutional violation was found to
support the court's exercise of federal question jurisdiction.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hughes. Also, its finding
was based by implication on the assumption that since the
fourteenth amendment applied to courts in other areas, that
the fifth amendment's proscription against taking without
just compensation as applied to the states by incorporation
through the fourteenth amendment also applied and limited
the state judiciary.'"' The taking analysis employed in
Robinson by the court has been termed by a commentator
Using this approach, the court
as the laymen's view.'
quantitatively compared the private property rights possessed before and after the state court's decision. Since the
private property rights had diminished, the court held that
the state court decision had resulted in an unconstitutional
taking of property rights without just compensation. '
The Hawaii federal court's finding that it possessed
original jurisdiction to determine whether the state court's
action in this matter was constitutional was rejected by the
5 4 The plaintiff in
fifth circuit in Reynolds v. Georgia."
Reynolds claimed that an unpredictable decision by a state
court had deprived her of fifth amendment rights. Although
the fifth circuit accepted the proposition that a state court
decision could operate unconstitutionally to deprive a person
of their property, it held that this determination was for an
appellate court to make. Consequently, the court in Reynolds
150. The radical change by the Hawaii Supreme Court was effected in McBryde
Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973), cert. denied,
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 976 (1974), where it determined
what water rights were possessed by landowners located adjacent to the
Hanapepe River. The court in its decision rendered two holdings that varied
radically from its prior decisions in that area of the law. First, it asserted
that the State owned all surplus water in the river and, second, it held
that acquired water rights could not be transferred.
151. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment was found to proscribe court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (due process clause).
152. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts "Take" Property? 2
U. HAWAII L. REV. 57, 63-67 (1979).
153. The Hawaii federal district court in a subsequent decision also found that
the Hawaii Supreme Court's radical departure from prior law constituted
a taking without just compensation. Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460
F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978).
154. 640 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1981).
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held that federal district courts are not empowered to hear
appellate issues since they only possess original jurisdiction.
In support of its decision, the Reynolds court cited Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co.1"5 There, the Supreme Court held that a
federal district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim that
a state's highest court had acted unconstitutionally. Thus,
although the Robinson decision has not been overturned, it
stands alone for the proposition it sets forth.
Without using constitutional safeguards, the Court has
attempted on occasion to broaden the scope of federal interests to impose some federal protection for riparian rights."'
In Hughes, the Court implicitly recognized that without
federal protection the state judiciary would be able to deprive the riparian federal patentee of the most valuable
attribute of her land-her right of access to the water. The
Court there relied on Borax in finding that deprivation of
this riparian right was not distinguishable from allowing
state law to interpret the original extent of federal grants." 7
In both instances, if state law were controlling, it would
have enabled the state to diminish the value of a grant that
was created by federal law pursuant to constitutionally
delegated powers.
In conclusion, although absolute equality of treatment
for the states is impossible, the Court should require an
overwhelming justification for imposing federal common
law on the states in an area of predominantly state concern.
In Hughes there was some justification as described above
for finding federal question jurisdiction but, if allowed on
the basis of a federal patent alone, it would be such a broad
expansion of jurisdiction that federal regard for the states'
right to control real property would be significantly diminished. Therefore, the needed protection might be better provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.
155. Id. at 706-07 (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)).
156. See discussions of Hughes supra in text accompanying notes 86-97 and
Bonelli supra in text accompanying notes 98-110.
157. Hughes v. Washington, upra note 44, at 292.
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C. The Type and Scope of Title Conveyed to the Public Land
States Under the Equal Footing Doctrine
Bonelli, like Hughes, was an expansion by the Court of
Borax. In Bonelli, the Court held that federal law applied
because the issue involved the extent of title acquired by
Arizona under the equal footing doctrine and Submerged
Lands Act. The Court acknowledged that if the land in question had vested in the state there would be no federal question jurisdiction present. 5 ' However, the Court held that
Arizona had not acquired a fee simple to the bed of the river
upon its admission to statehood. Instead, it found that the
State had a fee determinable upon the reliction of the water.
Thus, when the land in dispute re-emerged, the state no
longer had an interest in the property, and it reverted to
the riparian owner. This novel approach allowed the Court
to sidestep consideration of the assertion that retention by
the state of title would amount to a taking without just
compensation." 9 Additionally, the Court failed to adequately
explain why the equal footing doctrine would not preclude
this approach. Jurisdiction on these facts boiled down to
the fact that the federal government as sovereign had owned
the riverbed prior to Arizona's statehood and, therefore, it
could determine the type of title conveyed to the state. However, no such federal interest is present in the original thirteen states which lack a history of federal ownership. This
is precisely the type of disparity the equal footing doctrine
was intended to prevent, and several Supreme Court decisions have held that the new states have the same rights to
the soil beneath their waters as do the original states. 60
158.

Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, supra note 46, at 320. The Court stated that
"[t]he present case, however, does not involve a question of the disposition
of lands, the title to which is vested in the State as a matter of settled
federal law." Id.
159. Id. at 331-32.
160. As the Court stated in Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 12, at 58:
Grants by Congress of portions of the public lands within a Territory
to settlers thereon, though bordering on or bounded by navigable
waters, convey, of their own force, no title or right below high water
mark, and do not impair the title and dominion of the future State
when created; but leave the question of the use of the shores by the
owners of the uplands to the sovereign control of each State, subject
only to the rights vested by the Constitution in the United States.
See Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 14; Barney v. Keokuk, supra note 143;
Mumford v. Wardwell, upra note 16; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra
note 6.
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In Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, the Court stated
that California upon admission to the union had acquired
"absolute property in, and dominion and sovereignty over,
all soils under the [waters]" and consequently the state
could dispose of title to the beds in any manner it might
deem proper.' The only mentioned limitation on this absolute right was the federal navigational servitude which was
not at issue in Bonelli.'62 Surely, if Arizona had exercised
its right to convey the submerged property to a private
owner prior to its re-emergence, the Court would not have
found the owner's fee determinable upon the water's reliction. Furthermore, as in Hughes, the Bonelli Court failed
to recognize that Borax only applies to questions regarding the extent of title conveyed at the time statehood was
granted.
The parties in Corvallis did not request that the Court
reexamine Bonelli, but several states in amicus briefs did
urge that Bonelli be reviewed and overturned. The Court
reviewed Bonelli and found that in Bonelli it had erred in
holding that federal common law governed resolution of the
dispute there. Accordingly, the Court held that property once
subject to state law was not subject to defeasance by operation of federal common law. After Corvallis, it appears that
federal law will only be applied to determine the original
boundary of property conveyed by the federal government.
D. Adoption of State Law When a Dispute Involves Land
Held In Trust by the Federal Government
The Wilson holding reaffirms an Indian tribe's right
to an adjudication before a federal forum whenever reservation land is involved in a title dispute. Despite this recognition of the need for federal protection of tribal land rights,
the Court did not find it necessary to use a uniform federal
161. Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, supra note 11, at 65-67.
162. For a recent Court opinion discussing the navigational servitude, see Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), where the Court found that
the federal government could take action that would diminish or impair a
riparian owner's access rights to water without being required by the Constitution to compensate the owner for his loss. See also United States v.
Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). See Note, The Navigational Servitude and the
Fifth Amendment, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1505 (1980), for a discussion of the
history of the navigational servitude and the gradual expansion of its scope.
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rule of decision.' 63 Instead, the Court found that the Indians'
interest in having a uniform federal rule apply was outweighed by a substantial state interest in having its own
law apply. One factor that appeared to be important to the
Court in making this determination was what it perceived
would be the inequity, if it used a uniform federal rule, of
having disputes involving private owners resolved in one
manner under state law while disputes between private
owners and an Indian tribe would be resolved in a different
manner with a uniform federal rule. 4 In contrast, the Court
has not found a similarly substantial state interest in having
state law govern disputes between private riparian owners
that are situated on interstate boundaries, even though such
owners have their disputes which involve the interstate
boundary resolved by a uniform federal rule, while neighbors not on the boundary have similar disputes decided
under state law."6 5
The Wilson Court recognized in deciding whether to
adopt state law as the federal rule of decision that it should
consider a variety of factors that were relevant to the governmental interests involved. 6' However, the Court's subsequent analysis was insufficient in that it relied exclusively
upon the factors set forth in United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc. 7 The factors set forth in Kimbell were used to determine whether state law should be adopted in a controversy
involving a nationwide federal commercial program. Accordingly, the Court in Kimbell did not set forth an exclusive list
of factors to be used under all circumstances to determine
whether state law should be adopted. The Wilson Court,
however, failed to consider factors other than those set forth
in the commercial law context of Kimbell. Specifically, it did
not take notice of the fact that Indian reservations have a
special, federally-created sovereign status that should have
been considered in determining whether to use a uniform
federal rule.16
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
Id. at 674.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
Supra note 2.
See supra note 124.
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In Wilson, the Court also failed to properly apply the
6 9 In addition to the misuniformity factor used in Kimbell."
placed emphasis on intrastate uniformity as indicated above,
uniformity was also used in a manner that failed to give
appropriate weight to the fact that when the various American Indian tribes, including the Omahas, negotiated separately with the United States government for a resolution
of the conflicts between them, they acted in a sovereign
capacity and relied upon the authority of the federal government to conclude a treaty that would serve as a satisfactory
indication of the rights each would possess in an ongoing
relationship.170 By treaty the Omahas relinquished far-reaching territorial claims of sovereignty in exchange for a promise by the federal government that it would hold an established area of land in trust for the tribe to use and occupy.'71
By failing to use the available federal principles of accretion
and avulsion for disputes involving Indian land, the Court
ignored the tribe's expectations of having complete federal
protection for its interests. These expectations were created
by the government's recognition of the tribe's status as a
foreign nation during the treatying process as well as the
need to protect tribal land and affairs from state governmental interference. Thus, it was reasonable that the tribe
would assume that this type of dispute would be resolved
by applying the well developed uniform federal principles of
accretion and avulsion. 7 ' However, the Omahas' expectation
interests were ignored by the Court.
The Court also stated that federal jurisdiction alone
would be sufficient to insure that federal interests were not
169. See supra text accompanying note 164.
170. A treaty entered into with an Indian tribe prior to 1871 must be accorded
the same dignity and protection that would be given to a treaty with a
foreign nation. Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas.
344 (C.C.D. Mich. 1852) (No. 14,251); Anthony v. Veatch, 189 Or. 462,
220 P.2d 493, reh'g denied, 189 Or. 462, 221 P.2d 575 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 923 (1951); Matter of Adoption of Buehl, 83 Wash. 2d
649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). The status of Indian tribes as sovereign nations
for treaty negotiations was prospectively abrogated by Congress on March
3, 1871. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976).
171. A treaty was entered between the United States and the Omaha Indians on
March 16, 1854. 10 Stat. 1043. See United States v. Omaha Indians, 253
U.S. 275, 277-78 (1920).
172. Treaty rights cannot be diminished by the admission of a state into the
union. Holcomb v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla, 382 F.2d 1013 (9th
Cir. 1967) ; State v. Gurnoe, 53 Wis. 2d 390, 192 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
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impaired.'73 This assertion, however, ignored the fact that
reservation land and water rights were granted to the tribe
in its sovereign capacity with the expectation that federal
law and principles would govern all aspects of the tribe's
relationship with the federal government. Although federal
courts can control when state law is adopted, this decision
makes it possible that state law will be applied in certain
cases to deprive an Indian tribe of riparian rights where
federally developed principles would have protected such
rights. 7 " The Court acknowledged this when it stated that
although the application of state law could on occasion result
in a tribe losing land, on other occasions the tribe would be
as likely to gain property by virtue of the application of
state law. Thus, in Wilson the Court found that the state
interests in having state law apply outweighed the federal
interest in treating similarly situated Indian tribes uniformly. The Court did not find state interests to so outweigh
federal interests in Hughes where the federal interests present were not as substantial as they were in Wilson.
The federal courts, in developing a uniform federal rule
of accretion and avulsion, have been sensitive to the underlying rationale of the doctrines whereas some state courts
have stuck rigidly to the mechanical distinction between the
definitions of accretion and avulsion in developing the law
in this area with little regard for the underlying purposes
of the doctrines. 7 ' This difference should at least have been
considered by the Court in evaluating the factors to be used
in deciding whether to use a uniform federal rule. Additionally, the Court should have considered as relevant the
fact that the use of a uniform federal rule to determine
whether the change was accretive or avulsive would not have
resulted in an undue burden on the judicial system since a
federal body of law to govern such disputes has already been
developed. 7 ' This law could easily have been applied, and it
would not have required any significant Supreme Court in173. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra note 2.
174. If the Supreme Court intended state law to be adopted only when it accurately reflected federal principles, it was not explicitly set forth in Wilson.
175. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 108 Ariz. 258, 495 P.2d 1312 (1972).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 118-22.
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volvement. Also, the use of a uniform federal rule would
assure that such disputes were resolved by the application
of the principles underlying the accretion and avulsion doctrines and not by a state's reliance on a mechanical distinction based solely on the rate of change of a waterbody's
bounds regardless of the equities involved.
Since the federal government holds title to reservation
lands, state law should govern only to the extent that it does
not interfere with federal title.'77 By adopting state law to
govern when uniform federal rules have already been developed for similar disputes involving interstate boundaries,
the Court has allowed state law to determine the extent of
federally created property rights. This is inapposite to the
Court's Borax holding.'78 It also conflicts with the property
clause which has been held to require that when state law
is exercised to control rights affecting federal property, it
must not interfere with the federal government's right of
disposal.T' Here, as a result of adopting state principles of
accretion and avulsion, the land has been held not to be part
of the reservation. Therefore, the federal government has
been deprived of any possible future right of disposal by
the adoption of state law as the federal rule of decision.
It has been held that although the federal government
did not expressly reserve water use rights for the Indian
tribes in treaties with them, there are implied reservation
rights which appropriate sufficient quantities of water for
the irrigable land within the reservations. 8 ' In developing this reserved water rights doctrine, the Court recognized
the unique nature of society's obligation to the American
Indians and its federal origin.181 The Court has applied this
doctrine to permit withdrawal of water from state systems
of appropriation. This infringement upon the state's sovereign power over water was deemed necessary to insure
177. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 10, at 22.
178. Id. at 27.
179. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra note 43, at 142; Surplus Trading
Co. v. Cook, svpra note 43, at 650.
180. Arizona v. California, supra note 31; Winters v. United States, supra
note 31.
181. Arizona v. California, supra note 31; Winters v. United States, upra note
31.
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an adequate supply of water for the Indians in an arid
region and it protected their expectation of a continued
water supply. Just as reserved rights are of prime importance to the Indians, the right of access to water is equally
important. After Wilson, if an accretive or avulsive change
occurs in a waterbody bounding a reservation, state law will
likely determine the nature of such a change. Thus, an Indian
tribe could end up losing its right of access to water based
upon the application of a state law that embodies a mechanical distinction between the accretion and avulsion doctrines.
In Hughes, the Court recognized that the potential loss of
access to the ocean by a federal patentee was not a loss that
should be accepted; therefore, it required the use of a uniform federal rule to protect federal interests." 2 Although
Hughes is no longer "alive," the Court's recognition there of
the importance of the need to protect access rights where
there is a federal interest present by using a uniform federal
rule should have been considered by the Court in Wilson.
However, this factor was ignored and the Court failed to
explain why the tribe's interests in having a uniform federal
rule apply were not given appropriate consideration.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Bonelli and Hughes, the Court's application of federal
common law enabled the riparian owners to maintain the
riparian character of their property. However, if state law
had been applied, it would have resulted in a loss of access
rights for the upland private property owners involved. Since
the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to apply fifth
and fourteenth amendment protections to prevent state confiscation of riparian rights without just compensation, the
Court in Bonelli and Hughes sought to provide the needed
protection by applying federal common law. As the Court
indicated in Corvallis, federal common law was improperly
used in Bonelli, and the Bonelli majority's reasoning was
flawed in that it did not adequately explain how title to
property once passed from federal to state ownership could
be subject to later defeasance. The Bonelli Court also failed
182. Hughes v. Washington, spra note 44.
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to properly analyze the requirements of the equal footing
doctrine. Although the Bonelli Court's legal analysis and
reasoning was faulty, the Court correctly recognized that
there were valuable private property rights-riparian rights,
e.g., access rights-subject to being taken by the state without adequate protection being afforded by the law. Since in
Corvallis the Court determined that federal common law
could not be used to protect the riparian rights of private
owners, other methods of protection should be considered to
determine whether they might be applicable in a given situation to protect a private owner's riparian rights from confiscation by a state without just compensation.
Logically, the protection of private property rights would
seem to be provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendments'
prohibition against taking without just compensation. However, as indicated above, the Court has held that the taking
of riparian rights does not require compensation under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. The case history that
supports this position should be reexamined to determine
whether it in fact justifies the Court's continuing exemption
of riparian rights from the list of property rights that cannot
be taken without just compensation by a state.
Some protection against an arbitrary taking of riparian
rights b ya state court can be provided by reliance on the
cases that hold a state court cannot radically change the
application of its law if such a change will diminish the
rights of a private property owner. This approach could be
used by federal courts to prevent state courts from altering
the tests used to determine whether an accretive or avulsive
change has occurred. Consequently, state courts would not
be able to arbitrarily change the criteria used for deciding
whether a change in a waterbody's bounds was avulsive
or accretive. Absent the application of constitutional safeguards, state courts are completely free to apply the accretion and avulsion doctrines in whatever manner they desire,
regardless of past practice and precedence. This could result
in the acquisition of large tracts of land by a state without
it having to tender just compensation. .
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/1
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The Court in Wilson properly resolved the property issue
before it as a matter of federal law, but it failed to recognize
a federal need for applying a uniform federal rule. In Wilson,
the Court failed to go beyond the factors set forth in Kimbell
to discuss the unique status, expectation and treaty rights
of the Omaha Indian tribe. Additionally, the Court placed
an undue amount of weight on the asserted need for intrastate uniformity when the Court should have looked at the
need for uniform treatment of all tribal lands similarly
situated. Thus, this holding was based upon an unnecessarily
limited analysis of the factors that should have been considered by the Court and a faulty analysis of some of the factors
it did consider.
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